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Benchmarking Tax Administrations in
Developing Countries: A Systemic
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Abstract: Benchmarking as a way of establishing standards for evaluating the performance of tax
administrations has become increasingly popular in recent years. Two common approaches to
benchmarking are ‗benchmarking by numbers‘ – the quantitative approach and ‗benchmarking by
(presumed) good institutional practice‘ – the qualitative approach. Both these approaches consider each
component or aspect of the tax administration separately. This paper suggests a contrasting approach to
benchmarking, the purpose of which is less to allow others to assess the performance of a tax
administration than it is to permit an administration to understand and improve its own performance. This
systemic approach is more conceptually and operationally difficult because it requires considering how all
aspects of the administrative system function as a whole in the context of the environment within which
that system is embedded and operates. On the other hand, it is also more directly aimed at understanding
and improving the key operational strategies that define good, better and best tax administrations.
JEL classification: D23, H29, H83, K34, O57
Keywords: tax administration, benchmarking, developing countries
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Benchmarking as a way of establishing standards for evaluating the performance
of tax systems has become increasingly popular in recent years.3 The concept of
benchmarking, which emerged from management literature, can be thought of as a
systematic process for identifying and measuring ‗performance gaps‘ between one's own
outputs and processes and those of others, usually those recognized as leaders in the field.
Alternatively, in some instances the gap assessed is that between actual performance and
some hypothetical ‗ideal‘ performance. In either case, the motivation underlying such
studies is presumably that by identifying such gaps one can perhaps first begin to
understand why they exist and then to understand how the gaps might be closed in the
country being studied.
1. Why Benchmark?
To illustrate the need for some kind of benchmarking, consider a possibly
apocryphal story. Some years ago the director of railways in India, a country in which
railways traditionally constitute the core of the transport system, was asked ―Why do you
bother to have a timetable when the trains are always late?‖ His reply was both simple,
and accurate: ―How would you know they were late if we did not have a timetable?‖4
As this story suggests, from one perspective benchmarking is in effect a way of
establishing a ‗timetable‘ -- a set of clear and ideally measurable objectives against which
to measure performance. These objectives may be an idealized vision of what should be.
They may be a more or less well-based estimate of what should happen if the system
worked well. Or they may simply be based on past experience or on the average
outcomes suggested by experience elsewhere. However such benchmarks are established,
once they exist not only has a standard against which to judge reality been set, but, more
importantly, we know what information needs to be collected -- how late are the trains? -in order to determine the extent to which the goals established are actually met.
Although there are almost always elements of judgment in making such measurements,
the basic framework for analysis is nonetheless established by the timetable (the
benchmark, or standard).
Even when there is not only a timetable but also information on the extent to
which it is not met, however, we are only at the beginning of analysis. To continue with
the railroad story, we may know how many trains are late and by how much. But the real
3

See Gallagher (2005) as well as the database and discussion to be found on the website
http://www.fiscalreform.net/. For examples of benchmarking in developed countries, see Australian Tax
Office (2001) (an example of international benchmarking with respect to a major administrative change),
and Canada Revenue Agency (2008) (an example of benchmarking performance against established service
standards over time). For an overview of comparative tax administration practices in (mainly) developed
countries, see OECD (2009); similar data for a number of African countries may be found in International
Tax Dialogue (2010). Robinson and Slemrod (2009) is a first attempt to incorporate some of the useful
information collected by the OECD into a more systematic cross-country study. The OECD data, though
very valuable, must be used very carefully for such purposes owing to the many comparability problems
that remain to be sorted out.
4
We owe this story to Arindam Das-Gupta, whose pioneering paper on tax benchmarking in India (DasGupta (2002) is well worth consulting. For another early study, on eastern Europe and central Asia, see
Bird and Banta (2000).
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questions are: why are they late, and what can be done to improve matters? Trains may
be late for many reasons: system design failures (inappropriate signal configurations),
environmental factors (landslides, floods), operating problems (breakdowns), human
error (crew asleep or poorly trained). At best, all that benchmarking exercises can do is to
tell us that there is something that should probably be looked at more closely. They
cannot and do not tell us exactly what happened, why it happened, or how it can be fixed.
Most benchmarking exercises understandably emphasize quantitative measures of
success. However, what can be measured and what matters are not always the same. An
additional problem with some benchmarking of tax administrations, especially in
developing countries, is that many such exercises have been carried out more by
outsiders, such as those who pay (donor agencies) or those who criticize (NGOs), than by
tax administrations themselves. If those who must generate most of the critical data
needed for a benchmarking exercise are aware that they will be judged by it and they see
no direct benefits for themselves from accurate reporting, accurate reporting is unlikely to
ensue.5
Performance is usually defined as the relationship between what an institution
does – its outputs – and what it uses to do it with – its inputs. What most benchmarking
exercises do is essentially to consider (some) inputs --for example, money, people and the
extent and nature of IT (information technology) -- and (some) outputs -- for example,
revenue collection, arrears and evasion detected – with respect to a particular set of
activities packaged within a particular organizational structure. In addition,
benchmarking exercises may sometimes also consider a few aspects of the rather dark
box within which policy design (architecture), implementation systems (engineering),
and operations (management) combine to turn inputs into outputs. Even the most
extensive benchmarking study, however, can neither tell the whole story nor permit direct
inferences about causality.
As noted earlier, the information obtained from such exercises is more likely to be
useful if it is in the interest of those provide the information to do so accurately. It is also
more likely to result in meaningful change if it is in sufficient detail (for example, setting
out clearly the relative importance of non-reporting, underreporting and non-payment as
components of the tax gap by economic sector) to help managers identify risks and deal
with them. To put this point another way, as we develop in more detail later, the
objectives that are benchmarked must be congruent with the real strategic objectives of
the organisation. In addition, in principle input from clients (taxpayers) with respect to
the level and quality of service and compliance costs should also be included in

5

If those responsible for providing data know that what they report will be used to assess their performance,
they are unlikely to be totally uninterested and objective reporters: in the words of the original formulation
of ‗Goodhart‘s law‘ ―any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it
for control purposes‖ (Goodhart 1975).
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benchmarking exercises.6 Finally, international benchmarking comparisons must take
into account at least the key relevant aspects of the different environments (income level
and distribution, growth rate, inflation rate, degree of ‗informality,‘ etc.) within which the
activities being compared take place.7
Much real-world benchmarking of tax administrations is deficient in one (or
sometimes all) of the respects just mentioned. Nonetheless, the basic logic of
benchmarking is sound and should in principle be both attractive and useful even to those
who are being benchmarked: if other organizations deliver similar services better than
you do, why not learn from them? Modifying and adapting the successful practices of
others has always been an important way in which individuals and organizations improve
their performance. Indeed, tax administrations around the world are currently increasing
the extent to which they share information with other administrations in an effort to
improve both their own performance and to control tax evasion and avoidance practices
that have become increasingly ‗globalized‘ in recent decades. Such information
exchanges are obviously useful and are likely to become even more important in the
future.8
One common aim of benchmarking tax administrations is of course to improve
their operation, for instance, by allowing consultants and international agencies to
provide somewhat more objective ‗grading‘ or ‗ranking‘ appraisals of tax administrations
in developing countries than they might otherwise be able to do.9 However, if, as is often
6

An important question that is not explored here is the extent and manner in which surveys with respect to
how the public perceives the revenue administration should be explicitly factored into the discussion. For
example, in an interesting early Indian study of public sector agencies such as hospitals and electricity
distributors, perceptions with respect to staff behaviour (eg, with respect to corruption) and the amount and
reliability of the information provided to the public were found to overlap strongly with perceptions of the
quality of the service provided (Paul 1995). See also Reinikka (1999) for an overview of possible uses of
surveys and especially Kelly and Hopkins-Burn (2010) on the interesting New Zealand Inland Revenue
experience with customer service surveys.
7
This important ‗environmental‘ issue is not discussed further here: for reviews of the importance of
understanding in detail the setting within which revenue administrations must function, see Gill (2000) as
well as Vazquez-Caro, Reid and Bird (1992).
8
See Keen and Ligthart (2006) for a careful discussion of the uses and limitations of information exchange
in tax administration and OECD at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf for a model tax
information exchange agreement (TIEA); a list of existing TIEAs may be found at
http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_33767_38312839_1_1_1_1,00.html. For different
perspectives on current and prospective future trends along these lines, see Pinto and Sawyer (2010) and
Eccleston (2010). It should perhaps be noted that, like all good things, international information exchange
carries some risk. For instance, excessive attention to interactions with other national administrations may
sometimes result in the entrenchment of what turn out to be systematic errors. To illustrate, it may perhaps
be argued that in the past discussions in such international organizations as the Inter-American Centre of
Tax Administrators (commonly known by its Spanish acronym, CIAT) may at times -- for example by
emphasizing the importance in the early stages of adopting IT of focusing on such ‗best practices‘ as
taxpayer identification numbers to ‗automate‘ taxpayer accounts -- have inadvertently diverted attention
from more important and much broader issues such as how best to use the new technology to improve the
control of evasion and the services provided to taxpayers. For other examples of the misuse of technology
in tax administration, see Bird and Zolt (2008).
9
The search for a clear and simple numerical answer to inherently complex questions appears to be neverending: for a critical evaluation of earlier attempts to establish ‗tax effort‘ targets for developing countries,

Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing Countries: A Systemic Approach

5

the case in developing countries, the intended objective at least in principle is ultimately
to provide some useful guidelines for restructuring a particular tax administration – as it
were, to lay the basis for a ‗re-engineering‘ strategy so objectives may be achieved more
efficiently and effectively -- most benchmarking exercises fall far short.10
Benchmarking may sometimes be useful to identify areas of weakness – symptoms. As
already mentioned, however, it seldom provides either clear explanations of the
underlying problems or insights that are helpful in resolving those problems.
Nonetheless, even incomplete and partial benchmarking may sometimes further such
important (though usually implicit) objectives as encouraging administrations to collect
and analyse data that they need to collect and analyse if they want to know what they are
doing. If a benchmarking exercise also serves to establish a potentially useful ‗best
practice‘ standard of behaviour to which they should aspire, that is another bonus.
Unfortunately, most existing examples of benchmarking are too narrowly conceived to
serve such purposes.
In the next section, we discuss briefly three alternative approaches to
benchmarking tax administrations and make the case for what we label the ‗systemic‘
approach. In the balance of the paper, we then set out a basic framework for systemic
benchmarking. We conclude with a brief consideration of why this approach has not, to
date, been widely accepted.
2. Approaches to Benchmarking
Three broad approaches to benchmarking may be found in practice and in the
literature. The first, and by far the most popular, is ‗benchmarking by numbers‘ – the
quantitative approach. The second, also popular, is ‗benchmarking by (presumed) good
institutional practice‘ – the qualitative approach. In practice, mixed varieties of these two
approaches are also commonly found. It is easy to mix them because both approaches
share an important common characteristic: they consider each component or aspect of the
tax administration separately. In contrast, the third approach -- the systemic approach set
out later in this paper -- requires considering how all aspects of the administrative system
function as a whole in the context of the environment within which that system is
embedded and operates.
2.1 Benchmarking by numbers
As a simple example of (prescriptive) benchmarking by numbers, a recent World
Bank study (Le, Pham and De Wulf 2007) suggested that the following quantitative
benchmarks might be used (along with other indicators) to measure ‗success‘ in revenue
administration reform projects such as those that have been financed by the Bank11: (1)
see Bird (1976). Of course, one complaint does not an avalanche stop, so recently one of the authors gave
in and contributed to the continuing flood of international tax ratio comparisons in Bird, Martinez-Vazquez,
and Torgler (2008).
10
For an excellent discussion of the kind of basic re-engineering that is inevitably required when a major
administrative restructuring is taken seriously, see the case of Singapore discussed in Sia and Neo (1997).
11
For an earlier review of some of the extensive World Bank assistance in this area, see Barbone et al.
(1999).
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administrative cost should decline by 30% over project period and (2) compliance cost
should be reduced by 2% of tax revenue over project period. These numbers were based
largely on a number of different and not always directly comparable studies carried out in
a disparate set of countries and circumstances by a variety of scholars and institutions.
OECD (2009), for example, found that administrative costs varied from a low of 0.45%
of revenue collected in the U.S. to a high of 2.41% in the Slovak Republic, while the
similar range in a group of non-OECD countries was from 0.60% in Chile to 5.8% in
Cyprus. While less easily obtainable, similar variations may be found in compliance
costs: for example, Evans (2008) reports that the costs of complying with such broadbased taxes as income taxes and VATs range between 2 and 10% of the revenue
collected.
None of these numbers has any clear interpretation, however. For example, as
OECD (2009) notes, the administrative cost ratio is a poor indicator of the effectiveness
of any tax administration for the obvious reason that it takes no account of the extent to
which the actual revenue base captured by the system differs from the potential revenue
base that should, according to law, be captured. It tells you how much it costs per dollar
to collect revenue, not how effectively the administration collects the revenue it should
collect. It may thus be a partial measure of administrative efficiency, but it is definitely
not a useful measure of administrative effectiveness. Indeed, it is not even a very useful
indicator of comparative efficiency both because many different factors may affect such
ratios and because countries measure these data in very different ways. Compliance costs
are usually even trickier to measure, let alone to interpret.
2.2. Benchmarking by good institutional practices
Much the same can be said about using such descriptive features as the existence
of a tax code or of a large taxpayer unit as indicating good practice and its absence as
demonstrating the opposite. For example, in a study some years ago one of us included
the existence of a fiscal analysis unit as an example of good practice on the assumption –
subjective, but based on considerable cross-country experience -- that the non-existence
of such a unit made it less likely that there was either a sustained high-level commitment
to change or a coherent strategy for change (Bird and Banta 2000). A somewhat similar
approach is carried to an extreme by the European Commission (2007) in a document that
lays out the ‗fiscal blueprint‘ against which the tax administration in countries applying
for admission to the European Union (EU) is to be assessed.
The EU example is particularly noteworthy because point-values are established
for several different components of each of 14 different aspects of tax administration with
pass marks (‗desired scores‘) set for each. In other words, not only are a large number of
presumably desirable characteristics such as ‗clear rules and procedures that require the
prompt and accurate recording of all tax audits undertaken‘ given a numerical score
compared to the maximum score of 100, but each of these many characteristics is
assigned a certain weight in deriving the overall score, and a ‗pass‘ level is set for each.
Despite all the numbers, however, the evaluation of most of the features singled out in
European Commission (2007) depends entirely on subjective judgment in several key
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respects – to determine how any country‘s administration scores in any particular
category, to determine what would constitute a perfect score, to set the pass score in each
category, and to weight the results for different categories. Qualitative benchmarking in
its most (superficially) scientific guise!
Whether using real numbers, estimated numbers, or completely subjective
numbers, such exercises in benchmarking by the numbers dodge some large and
uncomfortable questions. In practice, the operational practices in any administration
necessarily respond to strategic realities and practices.12 How tax administrations perform
in practice largely reflects several underlying determinant factors such as the context or
environment of tax administration within the public sector as well as, more broadly, the
economic environment (e.g. the size of the informal sector), the political environment
(e.g. the degree of support for effective enforcement), the legal and regulatory
framework, and the managerial system of the tax administration. The point, of course, is
that simply measuring the performance of those activities that can be measured or
subjectively assessing performance in specified institutional activities and then
comparing that performance either to countries considered to have superior performance
or to some subjectively established goal (or to a regional or other average) does not help
provide a meaningful basis for diagnosing the ills of any particular administration unless
one also considers closely the environment in which it functions.
2.3. The need for systemic benchmarking
In order to establish the underlying causes of the problems that a benchmarking
analysis may uncover, at least the most important among the many factors that can
explain differences in performance among tax administrations must be taken explicitly
into account.13 In addition, such a study must also provide a vision of the reference
system for any given administration as well as a guide on how to adapt its practices to
meet a set of observed -- or perhaps ideal, or perhaps simply satisfactory -- standards.
To put this point another way, the aims of the kind of operationally focused
systemic benchmarking approach sketched in this paper are, first, to uncover and
understand the issues on which successful organizations have focused in order to improve
their performance and, second, to assess the extent to which, and how, the administration
under study deals with these issues given the context in which it works. From this
perspective, the key point in using benchmarking as a guide to restructuring tax
administration becomes not so much to define a particular set of benchmark indicators
but instead to identify the management practices -- good, better, and best -- that underlie
and explain a set of good indicators. With this approach, the ‗gaps‘ that need to be
12

We emphasized many of these points in our earliest joint work on this subject (Vazquez-Caro, Reid and
Bird 1992). Although much of our subsequent work along these lines was done in specific country
contexts and has not been published, some aspects are developed to some extent in the following papers:
Bird (1989, 2004); Bird and Casanegra (1992); Bagchi, Bird and Das-Gupta (1995); Bird and Banta (2000);
Vazquez-Caro (1992); and Vazquez-Caro and Ospina (2006).
13
This point is discussed and illustrated in such earlier studies as Vazquez-Caro, Reid and Bird (1992) and
Gill (2000). In the present paper, however, we focus more specifically on the legal and regulatory
framework and especially on managerial practices.
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focused on and the steps that need to be taken to improve tax administration in any
particular case are set out in a way that is operationally more meaningful for tax
administration management —albeit perhaps in a form that is less obviously quantifiable
or directly comparable across countries than may be to the taste of benchmarking
aficionados looking for a quick and quantifiable checklist against which to ‗grade‘
different tax administrations.
The next section outlines the basic analytical approach suggested. We then turn
to the problem of defining an appropriate reference system to implement this approach.
Finally, to illustrate how this approach may be applied we outline the major factors
determining successful tax administration and some basic benchmarks that may be sued
to measure those factors. To some extent, this discussion draws on work done for a large
developing country that wished to benchmark its practices in controlling tax evasion and
avoidance by large taxpayers against similar practices in several developed countries –
Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand and the United States -- that were chosen as
comparators because their tax administrations were considered to exemplify superior
performance in terms of collection and compliance as well as general management
processes. 14
3. Systemic Benchmarking
As in the case of the railway timetable example with which this paper began, to
identify appropriate benchmarks one must first ask why, exactly, one wants to benchmark
in the first place. Suppose, for instance, that the main objective is – as it was in the study
mentioned above -- to reduce evasion and avoidance by large taxpayers—the main direct
channel through which most revenue is collected in most countries.15 If this is the goal,
then an appropriate benchmark might be, for example, the best practices applied in
countries like those just mentioned that have demonstrably high compliance levels and
appear on the whole to control evasion and avoidance strategies by large taxpayers fairly
well.16 Assuming that this rather vague ‗standard‘ is taken as a starting point, two
questions then need to be answered: (1) What constitutes best practice in tax
administration? (2) What is the optimal international standard? Both questions are
complex.
Often, international practice – as set, for instance, by what ‗good‘ administrations
are doing -- is proposed for implementation in a particular country on the assumption that
14

Information restrictions prevent us from going into detail on this study, which was undertaken by Jaime
Vázquez-Caro in association with several colleagues, including Agélic Leguízamo, Álvaro Herrera and
José Ospina. In addition to the documents from ATO, CRA, and the OECD specifically referenced in this
paper, the discussion also draws on annual reports and other documents found on the websites of the
national tax administrations of France, New Zealand, and the United States.
15
As Bird (2002) emphasizes, large taxpayers (mainly corporations, of course) are much more important to
revenue administration than is measured by the taxes they themselves pay: they are also critical ‗tax agents‘
withholding and collecting personal income taxes and payroll from employees as well as value-added and
excise taxes.
16
Though of course even the ‗best‘ remains far from perfect, as discussed recently for Canada by Larin and
Duong (2009).
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the selected practice fits all situations. However, although segregated large taxpayers
units (LTUs) and integrated management systems as well as such features as voluntary
compliance, bank collection and returns processing, withholding, and the like are
common in ‗good‘ tax administrations, they are not always or necessarily good
prescriptions for developing countries.
For such practices to become integral parts of ongoing tax administration systems
in particular developing countries they often need careful and sometimes substantial
development and context modification. As an example, the implementation in Uruguay of
a model of large taxpayers‘ administration originally designed to cope with the Bolivian
crisis of the mid-eighties has been viewed by many as a good example of ‗technology
transfer‘ (Silvani and Radano 1992). On the other hand, both the staff of tax
administration and many small and medium taxpayers in Uruguay at the time complained
that while the large taxpayers unit (LTU) may have resulted in better services for large
taxpayers, it created chaos for the rest. Since presumably, tax administrations should be
equitable in satisfying their legal mandate, providing excellent service to those with
money and no service (or bad service) to those that are poorer hardly seems an
appropriate outcome. This does not mean that the LTU approach is wrong per se or even
that it was the wrong thing to do in Uruguay at the time.17 But it does suggest that a good
revenue administration also needs to consider how to improve services to ‗non-large‘
taxpayers as well -- or perhaps in some instances even to exclude them from being
expected to meet all the legally required formal tax obligations.18
Three distinctions may help identify ‗best‘ practices more precisely: between
strategic and operational practices; between explicit and implicit practices; and, finally,
between good, better and best practices. We discuss each in turn.
3.1. Strategic and operational practices
What constitutes a complete, congruent and modernized tax administration
system?19 A framework that captures both levels and processes is needed to identify
specific country gaps in tax administration strategy and managerial practices against any
reference base. We use the concepts of strategic and operational practices to differentiate
two related but quite different levels of practices determining tax administration
performance.
Most important are strategic practices that shape tax administration and that are
themselves shaped both by those who design administrative structures (legislatures and
top executives) and by those who execute them – for example, the top management of the
Australian Tax Office (ATO) or Canada Revenue Agency (CRA). The broad rules of the
17

As Baer, Benon and Toro (2002) argue, LTUs have proven to be useful in a number of countries.
The two points mentioned in the text, for example, are suggested by the emerging literatures on the
‗state-capacity building‘ importance of good tax administration (Brautigam, Fjeldstadt and Moore 2007)
and on the appropriate tax treatment of small and micro enterprises (International Finance Corporation
2007) – literatures that, it should be noted, are by no means always in agreement.
19
For a full discussion of the notion of ―congruence‖ in this context, see Gill (2000).
18
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tax game are set by legal mandates in the form of specific substantive laws as well as by
procedural law and administrative law in general. Management interprets these rules by
creating institutional, technological and operational ways to secure compliance. The
strategic practices that tax administration management adopts in addressing particular
issues ultimately become operational practices.
To put this point another way, underlying any operational practice in principle
there is presumably either some element of the legal mandate or an identifiable responses
to specific environmental conditions. If the results observed in any particular operational
area are unsatisfactory, this approach to benchmarking suggests that the root cause may
be either the absence of appropriate laws and regulations or an inappropriate managerial
approach addressing the specific issue. It is obviously important to know whick of these
problems exist.
In practice, many benchmarking efforts even in developed countries focus on such
operational practices as audit and taxpayer service. For example, the Canada Revenue
Agency (CRA) reports that in 2006–07 only 36% of actuarial valuation reports met its
‗service standard‘ of being completed within nine months, compared to the expected
target of 80% (Canada Revenue Agency 2008). If this ‗target‘ makes sense, then
presumably what this suggests is that CRA is not doing a terribly good job in this area.
However, neither the target nor the reported performance can be meaningfully interpreted
except in the context of the underlying strategic practices. This point emerged clearly in
an early benchmarking exercise in Colombia in the 1970s, when area directors were
directed to create performance tables for their respective areas and comparative tables
were then constructed to compare the performance of administrative units of similar size
and complexity with respect to such factors as the percentage increase of taxes generated
by audit interventions, efforts to control tax arrears, and the number of appeals. This
exercise proved useful in making regional tax administrators aware that their results were
being assessed and compared, and has remained a regular part of tax management in
Colombia. However, it soon became clear that any given result could almost always be
explained not only by managerial performance but also by such ‗exogenous‘ factors as
legal loopholes or changes, budgetary problems, and commodity booms or busts.20 Even
within the context of one country with a uniform legal system many of the questions that
emerged from benchmarking often need to be answered in strategic rather than simply
operational terms.
On the international level, even more factors come into play. In some countries,
for instance, the person responsible for VAT is considered an agent (like a withholding
agent) whereas in others—like most Latin American countries—the person responsible
for VAT is considered to be a taxpayer. The first definition is much more stringent
because it assumes that if the money is not deposited, the person responsible for VAT is
20

For an interesting and much more systematic quantitative attempt to compare the ‗productive efficiency‘
of tax offices (in Belgium), see Moesen and Persoon (2002); other relevant country studies of aspects of
this issue, with varying degrees of sophistication, include Hunter and Nelson (1996) on the United States,
Klun (2004) on Slovenia, Serra (2005) on Chile, Forsund et al. (2006) on Norway, von Soest (2007) on
Zambia, and HMRC (2010) on the United Kingdom.
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stealing the money. He is committing a criminal offense. Obviously, these two
approaches may generate completely different attitudes toward delinquent VAT
taxpayers.
Similarly, the statute of limitations differs from country to country in terms of
time limits and consequences. For example, in most developed countries there is no time
limit in evasion cases where there is fraud. Even when there is no fraud, taxpayers may
sometimes be audited up to 10 years later. In contrast, many developing countries
impose much more rigid time limits on administrative action. In Colombia, for example,
returns, even if fraudulent, may only be audited within two years of filing. To counter
the obvious adverse effects on revenue of such limits on ‗normal‘ good tax administration
practice, Colombia has introduced substantial withholding on all types of income and
sales combined with a complex and slow system of tax rebates. The initially bad
strategic practice of legally overly restrictive limits on auditing thus resulted in the
introduction of still more ‗bad‘ operational practices in the form of deliberate overwithholding and an inadequate refund system.
Each country has its own complex legal apparatus of thresholds, taxpayer
definitions, base definitions, standard deductions, inflation adjustments, exclusions,
exemptions, statutes of limitations, penalties, amnesties, tax return forms, audit methods,
and collection strategies. Each thus has a unique country-specific system that establishes
and defines different risk conditions and attitudes for both administration and taxpayers.
One cannot interpret simple international comparative ‗benchmarking by numbers‘
exercises without clearly understanding all these factors.21
3.2. Explicit and implicit practices
Even when a particular operational practice is perceived as a success, that success
may rest on some embedded practices that are simply taken for granted. For example, an
important implicit practice guiding the Canada Revenue Agency is the concept of the
‗protection of the base‘ that CRA labels as the underlying value defining its strategic
vision. Such implicit values may be reflected in many different ways in different aspects
of the administrative system and may also influence legal developments. In Canada, for
example, the design of tax forms -- the instruments through which the administration
filters the legal framework at the individual level at the moment of compliance -- is not
usually identified as a good practice. However, it clearly is good practice in the sense that
it is an operational reflection of CRA‘s strategic position regarding the information it
requires in order to protect the tax base. Indeed, in most developed countries, return
forms reflect a conscious information gathering strategy. They are set up to provide

21

Of course, earlier writers recognized many of the problems with benchmarking and performance
measurement and have proposed different approaches and solutions: for some interesting examples, see
Behn (2003), Nordegraaf and Abma (2003), Propper and Wilson (2003), Pollitt (2005), Hood (2007),
Aberbach and Christensen (2007), van Stolk and Wegrich (2008). However, no previous paper of which
we are aware has taken the same ‗management‘ focus as the present paper.
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detailed information on the determination of the tax base, often with annexes to further
explain individual base situations based on qualitative profiling of the taxpayer.22
In contrast, in most developing countries little or no effort is made to capture
detailed base information as part of the sworn return. The emphasis is on the payment
part, not the tax base part, of the form. Indeed, in practice tax administrations in many
developing countries are happy to accept payments even when mandatory forms are not
submitted or when most required fields on forms have not been completed.
Such implicit, accepted but largely invisible practices as how forms are designed
(and distributed, and dealt with once received) may be more important than more explicit
practices (such as audit frequency) in explaining success or failure. If a tax
administration has no reliable information on the reported tax base -- let alone
meaningful estimates of the potential tax base -- it has no real basis for assessing its
performance. Unless such practices are clearly recognized, comparison between
administrations, let alone the transfer of knowledge from one tax administration to
another is unlikely to be very useful.
For example, many low-income developing countries seem unlikely to be able to
pursue the ‗no return‘ policies currently in place, or advocated, in a number of developed
countries.23 The latter can follow this path – as, to a limited extent, have a few mediumincome countries like Chile and Singapore (Bird and Oldman 2000) – largely because
they have both developed financial structures and good tax administrations. When
countries are not so fortunate as to be able to ‗ride‘ on a basically well-developed
financial system that encompasses most of the potential tax base (Gordon and Li 2009),
however, they must work much harder to gather the information needed to improve their
tax systems – and of course they have fewer resources with which to do so. Close
attention to the nature, quantity and quality of the information flowing into the tax
administration is especially crucial in poor countries. Equally, however, it is especially
difficult for such countries to deal with this issue. Before one can ‗protect‘ the revenue
base, one must have a good idea of what that base consists and where it is located.
3.3. Good practices and best practices
To identify the best strategic (implicit or explicit) practices that may provide a
useful standard for assessing operational practices in any country is at least a four-stage
process. First, one must identify the relevant strategic practices. Second, in each country
selected as a comparator one has to select good practices. Performance of any activity
22

For similar reasons, scholars such as Oldman (1965) have recommended that penalty structures should be
designed to take into account not only the direct tax escaped by an offender but also the ‗indirect cost‘
imposed as a result of his failure to provide information required to monitor the transactions of others.
Interestingly, as Arendse (2010) reports for South Africa, taxpayers often do not perceive – or are not
persuaded by – this rationale and hence tend to think that automatic penalties for such ‗information gapcausing‘ activities as failing to file on time are excessively high.
23
A good example is the Danish system called TASTSELV—the automated tax process or ‗no touch
strategy‘ as described in http://www.itdweb.org/documents/public/denmark.TASTSELV%20%20the%20automated%20tax%20administration.pdf.
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may be considered good when the result is both effective (what is done is what should
have been done in the specific conditions) and efficient in terms of costs, resources and
time. Third, one must determine the best practices at the country level. To do so, one has
to compare good practices and establish that there is a qualitative or quantitative relative
advance (beyond ‗normal‘ improvement or the past average of the tax administration).
Finally, one has to compare best country practices within a holistic view of the tax system
in the country being benchmarked in order to establish a target that is appropriate for that
country, given its capacities and the problems it faces.
To do all this requires the collection and analysis of information on each process
being benchmarked in its specific context in order to be able to compare them both
quantitatively (if data are available) and qualitatively, while at the same time trying to
understand the logic behind the practices in each environment. In particular, one needs to
consider what factors appear to determine the success of any good (let alone best)
practice. To do so, one needs a clear view with respect to three distinct aspects of the
practice being benchmarked: first, reality in the sense of how the practice is adjusted to
the specific circumstances of the case in hand as well as how it might be customized;
second, capacity in the sense of the available operational implementation capacities in
terms of resources such as staff; and third, the environmental (legislative, cultural)
setting. The flavour of what needs to be done is nicely captured in CRA‘s statement that
―performance targets are established by our management teams through analysis of
affordability constraints, historical performance, the complexity of the work involved,
and the expectations of Canadians‖ (Canada Revenue Agency (2009, p.15).
Summing up, in the approach suggested here, best practice benchmarks should
reflect the application of the most advanced knowledge of the state of the art in the
sector, the response to specific pressures that may have forced creative solutions which
respond to a systemic view, and, not least from a dynamic perspective, the capacity to
alter paradigms through innovation and risk taking. This is obviously both a demanding
and to some extent an inherently ‗fuzzy‘ task. In the remainder of the paper we describe
how such systemic benchmarking might work.
4. Finding the Polar Star
For centuries, navigators have used the polar star for guidance.24 Is there an
equivalent ‗pole star‘ that may be used as a reference point for reforming tax
administration management? An appropriate starting point for developing countries that
wish to improve (modernize) their revenue administration may perhaps be found in a set
of underlying values that are found in ‗good‘ tax administrations in developed countries
such as Canada and Australia. These values, which unfold as strategic practices that in
turn structure operational practices arguably include the following:

24

Potentially, there are both north and south polar (or pole) stars, depending on the stellar configuration,
but most attention was historically paid to the north star in celestial navigation. While stars' positions
change throughout the night, the pole star‘s position in the sky does not, so it is a dependable indicator of
the direction north.
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A high level of commitment to protect the tax base
A cooperative (or collaborative) compliance model
Concern for equity above maximization of collection
Rationalization of transaction costs related to tax compliance
Strategic management development within the changing role of tax administration
as the country changes
The ‗internationalization‘ of tax administration as a response to limitations in the
coverage of national tax systems
Standardization of tax processes based on automation and the formalization of
processes and deeper use of the internet
Major focus on the development and satisfaction of human resources

The sharp differences between most developed countries and most developing
countries with respect to most of these factors explain many of the observed differences
in their tax administration performance once one adjusts for the very different
environments that (on average) these two (very heterogeneous) classes of countries
provide for tax administration. Most strikingly, practices in most good developed country
administrations have steadily moved towards redefining the relationship between
taxpayers and tax administration from the long-standing ‗adversarial‘ legal approach—
taxpayers try to cheat and tax officials try to catch them—to a new model of cooperative
compliance, in which the central role of the revenue administration is to foster and
encourage tax compliance rather than simply to seek out those who fail to comply and
punish them appropriately.25
4.1 The adversarial approach
―Catch Me if You Can!‖26 Models of hunter and hunted, predator and prey, thiefcatcher and thief, have at times been used to explain the relation between revenue
administrations and taxpayers. Such an inherently adversarial approach may be depicted
as a sequence of actions in which each party acts individually and without
communication with the other party, who then reacts. This adversarial sequence of
‗action‘ and ‗reaction‘ begins with the assumption that there is an initial risk of cheating
by the taxpayer. It further assumes that the main task of the revenue administration is to
detect such cheating through the audit process and then to punish it appropriately. At
each stage of this approach, taxpayers are almost always allowed to defend themselves
through a variety of administrative and judicial measures. The working process is
sequential: (1a) You declare, (1b) I verify; (2a) you appeal and stop paying, (2b) I
analyze and resolve the appeal; (3a) you open judicial review…and so on (Figure 1).

25

The ‗cooperative compliance‘ model set out in Braithwaite (2003), among other places, is most explicitly
applied in Australia (see ATO, 2000 and 2009). An even broader ‗fiscal exchange‘ perspective is
suggested in Whait (2010)
26
This is the title of a chapter (on audit and assessment) in Radian (1980).
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As tax systems become more complex, however, this sequential model becomes
increasingly limited. For example, when different jurisdictions are claimants for a
multinational tax base, or there is general hostility against taxes, it becomes difficult (for
both sides) to manage tax obligations and may be quite costly for whoever loses out in
the process. All too often, the adversarial approach results in a relatively unproductive
tax administration and substantial tax evasion.
4.2. The cooperative approach
For these reasons, most developed country tax administrations have largely
rejected the adversarial approach and moved towards cooperative compliance as a new
way to relate with taxpayers, particularly with large taxpayers and those with
international operations. This evolution towards cooperative schemes, especially but not
exclusively with respect to large taxpayers, is evident in Canada and Australia, for
example. Payroll taxes, personal income tax withholding, corporate taxes, sales taxes,
excise taxes – in every instance a relatively small number of organizations are directly
responsible for channeling most taxes to governments.
The distinguishing characteristic of this model is that, instead of being sequential
like the adversarial approach, there is now some degree of conscious interaction between
administration and taxpayer at each step of the taxing process in an attempt to find
agreement and closure, within legal parameters. The party primarily responsible for each
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step of the tax compliance process remains the same, but the other party is now expected
to assist and participate in achieving a satisfactory resolution. For example, compliance
with tax declaration and return requirements is facilitated by attempting to obtain
consensus on the interpretation of the tax law; audit cases are selected primarily through
risk analysis carried out according to risk factors made known to the taxpayer; and audits
are carried out according to a plan agreed with the taxpayer to lessen the transaction costs
on both sides.27 The idea is to reduce the probability of conflict at every step and to
increase the likelihood of reaching satisfactory closure. The administrative objective is to
engage in the least costly combination of enforcement and dispute resolution activities
(fewer audits, fewer judicial reviews) while improving compliance (immediate and
future). For the taxpayer, the main gain is to reduce compliance costs (including psychic
and uncertainty) costs.
Clearly, whether such an approach is successful or not depends largely on the
extent to which both sides perceive the possibility—and the potential gains to them—of
developing a larger ‗trust‘ space, for example as a result of more interaction in the
relationships at different stages of the process, pre-agreed higher compliance levels,
lower transaction costs, higher voluntary compliance and lower levels of uncertainty.
Of course, when these conditions are not met—when some taxpayers simply refuse to
play the new cooperative game—the traditional process always remains as an option to
be used by exception. However, when more ‗trust-based‘ relations with taxpayers can be
developed, both the tax administration and the tax system in general can become more
effective and less costly by reducing uncertainty (and thus risk and costs) in both the tax
process and its outcomes for both taxpayer and administration. Moreover, although
adopting a more cooperative approach to revenue administration requires at least some
initial degree of trust to operate successfully, over time this approach may also in itself
prove to be one important way in which more such trust (social capital) may be built.28
An additional important potential gain from moving to the cooperative approach
is that it facilitates a better and more permanent system of monitoring compliance,
particularly with respect to the larger entities that collect most revenues. Since the
cooperative system works more in ‗real time‘ there is less need than under the adversarial
system to figure out what happened in the often non-traceable past and more opportunity
to focus on what is going on in the present (and might go on in the future). In lieu of the
action-reaction system of the adversarial approach, under the cooperative compliance
concept rather than waiting for interpretation errors to happen -- with the result often
being often complex audits and large tax values under discussion -- to the extent possible

27

Of course, most tax administrations are reluctant to reveal such ‗trade secrets‘ for fear of making life too
easy for would-be evaders, just as the police do not publicize their patrol routes. Such secrecy may make
life a little more difficult for stupid criminals, but it is often equally sensible to make it clear that certain
buildings and activities are strongly guarded. Striking the right balance between the two strategies is
always a tricky matter. For further discussion of audit design and execution, see e.g. European Commission
(2010), Khwaja, Awasthi, and Loeprick (2010), and Biber (2010, 2010a).
28
As Brautigam, Moore and Fjeldstad (2007) emphasize, good (cooperative compliance) tax administration
not only requires some degree of trust; it is also in itself an important way in which such trust may be built.
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taxpayers and tax administration try to reach an agreement on the interpretative
determinants of the information to be included in tax returns.29
When this system works well, each party has both increased knowledge of the
other party‘s attitudes and expectations and greater clarity in the rules of the tax game.
With continuous interaction, taxpayer and tax administration get to know each other
better. The tax administration maintains protection of the tax base via a sort of regulated
consensus between the tax administration and the taxpayer throughout the different steps
of the tax process.30 For example, the administration develops credible evasion and
avoidance risk analysis to back up and guide the discussion as well as the necessary builtin transparency to deal with corruption risks.31 For taxpayers certainty is increased by
greater clarity in the rules and procedures of the tax relation, as the tax administration‘s
specific positions on the application of the tax law are extensively discussed and
conveyed through various mechanisms.
5. Implementing Cooperative Compliance
Viewed from this cooperative perspective, the universe of relations and
operational practices in the taxing process in countries with good administrations is quite
different from that which still exists in many developing countries.32 Broadly interpreted,
cooperative compliance is a concept that cuts transversely across the contents of all
substantive processes of tax administration. If improperly or inappropriately
implemented, however, this approach carries with it possibly enormous risks to the
revenue. It is therefore critical to look closely at how the managerial and operational
practices through which this strategic focus is implemented have to be structured in order
to attain positive results in terms of increased compliance and reduced administrative
costs for tax agencies as well as reduced compliance costs for taxpayers, while
simultaneously increasing the overall equity and efficiency of the tax system and
reducing the risks of evasion, avoidance and corruption.
At least six major factors seem critical to a successful transition to the cooperative
compliance model: structured risk management, viewing the taxpayer as a customer, the
29

For example, the spread in recent years of advance pricing agreements (APAs) is an attempt to deal ‗up
front‘ with some of the complex problems arising from international transfer pricing arrangements rather
than trying to deal with such problems long after the fact in what usually turns into an extremely long,
costly, and ultimately not very satisfactory dispute resolution process (Altman, 2006). Of course, the
simple existence of an APA does not mean that similar disputes and delays may not ensue; but sometimes it
helps.
30
For obvious reasons, tax officials do not like to call such discussions ‗negotiations.‘ Indeed, provided the
process follows a clear set of principles -- for example, with respect to the range of discretion available to
officials at different levels and the internal review system -- and is as fully transparent as consistent with
taxpayer confidentiality, it is the antithesis of the sort of exercise of unaccountable discretion by officials
that often underlies corruption.
31
For an interesting discussion of how some Brazilian state tax administrations have, by building up their
detailed knowledge of industry supply chains, strengthened both their risk analysis and their credibility in
the eyes of taxpayers, see Pinhanez (2008).
32
For an early view, of the traditional approach to tax administration, unfortunately still relevant in some
developing countries, see Radian (1980).
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quality of the tax laws, appropriate international networking, a wide range of consultative
arrangements, and generalized use of internet-based technology. In the balance of this
section we discuss each of these points in turn.33
5.1. Risk analysis
Risk analysis is how modern organizations commonly conceptualize and define
managerial actions. How tax administrations manage tax evasion risks, for instance,
obviously depends in part on the accuracy of accounting records. As the world has just
learned with respect to the financial sector, however, even the best accounting records do
not provide a complete picture of risk, so tax administrations have developed other
techniques to control risks such as risk-based auditing.34
If the cooperative compliance approach is to be effective, a new operational
setting with central units focusing on different compliance risks is needed. In effect, with
this approach the headquarters function becomes a complex (and usually heavily
automated) ‗back office‘ intended to improve and support audit delivery at the
operational ‗front end‘ of the tax system.
Risk analysis starts with the segmentation of clients and the identification of the
type of risks each client or group of clients poses. In some countries such risk analysis is
developed jointly with taxpayers, as in some Brazilian states (Pinhanez 2008). More
often, risk analysis is developed internally but shared to some extent with taxpayers.35
When this level of risk analysis is carried out appropriately, and the riskier points are
identified and closely monitored, tax administrations obviously increase their ability to
protect the revenue base.
From the perspective of the tax administration, risks may be classified as
relatively controllable or non-controllable. Non-controllable risks may or may not be
insurable. Risks arising from the basic design and vulnerability of the law and its
interpretation fall into the uninsurable non-controllable category from the perspective of
the tax administration: these are the cards they are given to play in the ‗game‘ of tax
evasion.

33

We do not discuss here another important factor -- the attitude of tax administrations in terms of
respecting, supporting and promoting the quality and welfare of their employees. Happier and more skilled
tax officials may not make taxpayers any happier, but unhappy and untrained officials can definitely make
them miserable. (Recall that, as mentioned earlier, we also do not discuss in this paper the many important
‗environmental‘ differences between developed and developing countries, highly relevant though such
factors undoubtedly are in determining just how and to what extent the approach suggested here may
perhaps be implemented in any particular country.)
34
See e.g. European Commission (2010) and Khwaja, Awasti and Loeprick (2010).
35
The United States appears in some respects to take this to what some might consider an extreme, perhaps
in an attempt to deter potential evaders. For example, the series of Audit Technique Handbooks by
industry available on line (http://www.smallbusinessnotes.com/operating/taxes/mssp.html) presents a rather
terrifying 20-40 pp. outline of the kinds of questions that an auditor – obviously a most unusual auditor,
who is unconstrained by time, other work, or any interest in the size of the potential tax liability involved -is reportedly instructed to verify in the course of an audit of, for example, a retail filling station.
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Since risk analysis is done within the formal rules of the game (laws and
regulations) that define what the tax administration does, these rules define the legal and
regulatory risk environment. Too many base exemptions, for example, break the
generality of the system and make it vulnerable to evasion and corruption. More
complex systems, with more lines drawn between what is taxable and what is not, are
open to more interpretation. Similarly, the shorter the period during which an
administration may initiate an audit, the higher the risks that are likely to be taken by
risk-taking taxpayers.
Taxpayers, like tax policy makers, may also change the rules of the game. For
example, if enough people play the tax ‗lottery‘ and evade in the expectation that they
will escape audit, then over time this becomes the game being collectively played and the
environment for tax administration has changed for the worse.
Good risk analysis requires the administration to have a deep understanding of the
taxpayer population. As noted earlier, good tax administrations have developed many
ways to gather and cross information by, for instance, designing tax forms to request
information useful to identify avoidance risks; by requiring promoters of so-called
‗aggressive avoidance‘ schemes to register36; by opening multiple access channels and
services for tax advisors; and in general, by gathering any information that helps the
administration understand the nature of the activities of the taxpayer and with it, its risks.
As the tax administration learns more, its improved ability to assess and manage
risks should lead to a reduction of risks as taxpayers learn that they cannot play the
system without being detected. In Brazil, a developing country that has both high tax
levels and substantial subnational taxing powers, even some state sales tax
administrations have in recent years managed to improve their performance significantly
by improving their in-depth knowledge of industry supply chains and thus upgrading
their understanding and analysis of evasion risk (Pinhanez 2008).37 If this process goes
far enough, eventually a new ‗tipping point‘ may be reached -- this time, however, to the
benefit of the tax administration.
5.2. Service standards: valuing the taxpayer as a customer
Customer orientation is the backbone of collaborative tax administration. Client
focus is a major concern when many tasks essential to the revenue process are performed
by clients themselves and the quality of the data they supply is essential to the
performance of the tax administration. The best developed country tax administrations
have thus shifted to essentially a ‗client-centered‘ organizational structure. One aspect of
customer orientation is taxpayer segmentation to define an organizational strategy, as in
36

See Larin and Duong (2009) for discussion of the problems such schemes are intended to deal with; it
remains questionable, however, how effective such control efforts really are.
37
Interestingly, the data generated by this new administrative focus has already led to some path-breaking
analysis of the interaction between taxation and ‗informality‘ in Brazil (de Paula and Scheinkman 2009,
2009a). For equally revealing studies again drawing on the newly detailed data available in other Latin
American countries, see Pomeranz (2010) on Chile and Anton and Fernandez (2010) on Mexico.
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the creation of Large Taxpayer Units (Baer, Benon and Toro 2001). Others have
suggested that similar specialized attention is needed with respect to the other end of the
business taxpayer spectrum – micro and small enterprises (IFC 2007).
But client orientation goes far beyond the organizational division of work. In
France, for example, the move towards centralizing functions around clients includes the
designation of high level individual staff members as the ‗access interface‘ for large
taxpayers with the administration. Revenue administrations more generally would seem
well advised to consider adopting and extending this practice if they are really interested
in getting taxpayers as much ‗on side‘ as possible. It is all too easy for even compliant
taxpayers with somewhat complex tax situations to be driven mad by dealing with a
recalcitrant bureaucracy that sends them from place to place and person to person,
continually asking for the same information. Once any issue has arisen, it would seem to
be simply ‗good business‘ to identify a single contact person through whom taxpayeradministration interactions are routed to reduce compliance costs and foster continued
good relations with clients.
The emergence of specific, and publicly reported, service standards in good tax
administrations around the world symbolizes the move to treating, and valuing, taxpayers
as ―customers‖ or ―clients.‖ Currently, for example, the Canada Revenue Agency
assesses its service performance annually against 41 explicit ―service standards‖ (CRA
2008). It would seem a logical next step – though perhaps one unlikely to be popular
with many revenue officials – to take this concern with client relations seriously and
identify clear contact points for taxpayers with complex issues. Even if the revenue
amounts involved may not be not ‗large‘ from the administration‘s perspective, they
likely are for the taxpayer, and the potential for generating bad will by giving clients the
‗telephone runaround‘ when they try to find out what is going on is high.
The establishment of specific services, service standards and compliance policies
for taxpayers, even if not directly (or at least measurably) related to increased revenue
may thus be an important step in improving administration. Once in place, service
standards should guide the relationship with taxpayers and should be consistently
improved. In effect, this approach creates a kind of ‗quasi-contract‘ between taxpayers
and management which, while defining service standards in terms of technical and
operational feasibility, ideally permits deviations for the benefit of the taxpayer wherever
possible. When, as is at least in principle true in the Canadian case cited earlier,
compliance with these standards becomes an important component in the annual reports
of the tax administration, this approach may provide an endogenous stimulus for
permanent improvement.38
In addition, as illustrated in Figure 2, service standards may affect the internal
organization of tax entities. Although service standards are almost entirely related to
38

Crandall (2010) provides a useful recent review drawing in part on Canadian experience as well as some
useful general discussion of the uses of internal performance measurement systems in developing countries.
In addition to distinguishing the strategic and operational uses of such systems, this paper also briefly
discusses performance measurement at the level of the individual official, an issue not discussed here.
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external processes dealt with by the front desk (interface with taxpayers) of the tax
administration, if they are to be effectively delivered substantial realignment of the
internal processes of the back office is also usually required. When taxpayers are placed
at the center of the process such investment in administrative design should both provide
benefits to citizens and increased efficiency as taxpayers are better able to influence the
quality of service they receive.39
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5.3. The quality of tax law
Other aspects of revenue administration may also benefit from incorporating more
‗client-focused‘ policies. In many developing countries, for example, the administration
has to cope with poorly conceived laws that generate major risks to the integrity of the
tax system. Tax law in a changing world is inevitably open-ended and never a complete,
coherent and simple set of rules. The problems arising from the quality (complexity,
inadequacy, incoherence) of tax law have become a political issue in many countries and
39

A good example is the Danish system called TASTSELV cited earlier (in note 22). See also the
discussion of the Singapore experience in Bird and Oldman (2000).
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have resulted both in ‗bills of taxpayer rights‘ in some countries (e.g. Canada) and in
others to major efforts – in the case of Britain in part with the aid of a private ‗think tank‘
(the Institute for Fiscal Studies) -- at ‗simplifying‘ tax law in various ways.40 Seldom,
however, have the damaging effects bad laws have on the quality of administration been
adequately taken into account.
In all too many countries, for example, tax administration has suffered greatly
from the propensity of governments to grant various tax incentives and ‗tax expenditures‘
without much care about their implications for either revenue collection or avoidance and
evasion practices. At the level of interpreting tax law, the possibilities are even more
open-ended. Exemptions and explicit and implicit loopholes embedded in tax laws
invariably generate a complex system that requires considerable interpretation by tax
officials in order to be applied to the almost infinitely varied real life situations of
taxpayers.
5.4. Consultation
Considerable specialized human capital on both the public and private sides of the
tax relation may be required to deal with such issues. For example, at the OECD as well
as in the United States, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere extensive and sometimes
prolonged discussions carried out in various internal and external ‗knowledge groups‘
have at times driven developments in dealing with tax avoidance, particularly
international tax avoidance. Australia and New Zealand in particular have made major
efforts to engage ‗stakeholders‘ in the tax system in discussions of a wide range of issues
including tax policy and assessments of administrative performance.41
5.5. The international dimension
In recent years, a key aspect in protecting the tax base at the country level has
increasingly been the establishment of a complex and increasing international network of
more or less formal arrangements intended to cross check and/or monitor increasing
volumes of international trade and financial transactions. Many such arrangements have
taken place under the aegis of the OECD (Eccleston 2010). The internationalization of
the tax base has thus increasingly resulted in the ‗internationalization‘ in many ways of
both tax policy and tax administration. In particular, tracing financial transactions
(e-financial transactions) has become a major strategic concern of tax administrations
40

For an extensive treatment of taxpayers‘ rights, see Bentley (2007). On the simplification project in the
UK, see, for example, Institute of Fiscal Studies (1998).
41
Although Canada has done less in this respect (Arnold 2011), a particularly explicit statement on this
issue was made in Canada some years ago: ―We will accelerate our work with interested provinces,
territories, and First Nations to create new opportunities for co-operation and partnerships. We will
strengthen partnerships with other government departments and governments to provide single-window
service. We will collaborate with tax professionals to promote compliance. We will work with the private
sector to build links to CCRA programs and services where it is in our mutual interest (Canada Customs
and Revenue Agency (CCRA) 2003). Note that CCRA became CRA, Canada Revenue Agency, in 2004.)
South Africa has perhaps done more along these lines than most developing countries, as discussed by
Bentley and Klue (2010) and Smulders and Naidoo (2010).
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everywhere, although as yet is not clear that such activities have significant results in
terms of improving outcomes.
5.6. New technology
Finally, information technology (IT) is increasingly a key support of cooperative
compliance strategy. In Canada, for example, initial automated audits, including source
deduction and information crosschecks, are followed by subsequent reviews,
verifications, examinations and audits with the objective of promoting the accurate
reporting of income and trade data, with the aim of reducing problems arising from
insufficient tax remittances as well as facilitating the early detection of reporting errors.
The idea is to avoid unproductive audits and to focus resource-intensive efforts on higher
risk segments while at the same time reducing the compliance burden for individuals and
businesses.
Increasingly, a key determinant of good tax administration today is the extent to
which compliance and taxpayer service can be managed and implemented through webbased technology. The appropriate design and implementation of such technology may
not only improve the quality of service at all levels; it may also reduce transaction costs
to taxpayers significantly. Different services ranging from simply information on laws
and regulations up to e-filing are provided on the web by a number of developed
countries. Importantly, in almost every case, such services were extended on a voluntary,
not mandatory basis: that is, taxpayers do not have to do it this way unless they perceive
sufficient benefits to themselves from doing so. However, judging from the ‗market test‘
of high take-up rates of such services in countries such as Denmark and, among
developing countries, Chile, moving towards web-based tax administrative systems seem
clearly the way to go.42
6. Benchmarking the Cooperative Compliance Model
Appropriate performance measures depend upon the objectives sought. With the
cooperative compliance approach that is now the basic way good revenue administrations
operate, the main objective is not simply to expand collections but to ensure that
everyone pays his or her ‗fair share.‘ Performance under this model cannot be improved
simply by increasing the number of audits. Indeed the more successful this approach is,
presumably the fewer audits, the fewer formal appeals and the fewer enforcement actions
to collect taxes in arrears are needed to improve or maintain collection levels. Tax
administrations pursuing an approach aimed at creating an environment through
facilitating cooperative compliance so that taxpayers are less likely to cheat or delay

42

As early as 2004, the first year of Denmark‘s ‗automated‘ system, less than 10% of the taxable
population made any corrections to the pre-filled return. In Chile in 2005, 96% of taxpayers filed over the
Internet, and 57% of the 1.2 million (out of 1.7 million) who received a pre-filled return accepted it without
adjustment. Not all stories are so immediately successful, of course: in Malaysia only 20% e-filed in 2007
apparently more because most taxpayers saw no advantage in doing so than because they found it difficult
to do so (Manaf, Ishak and Warif 2010).
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payment thus need to measure their performance differently than when their dominant
aim is to catch cheaters and penalize those who do not cooperate.
To illustrate, Table 1 provides an illustrative list of several items that seem
appropriate in assessing the gaps between the performance of a particular tax
administration and that of a good, better, or perhaps even ‗best practice‘ administration.
TABLE 1
Strategic Objectives in
Managing a Tax
Administration



Establish basic internal and control systems of tax administration



Greater concern for equity than maximization of collection



‘Internationalization’ of tax administration



Formalization and standardization of cooperative compliance processes



Migration to web-based interactive processes



Client focus



Deeper risk analysis



Tax forms information strategy



Participation in shaping of legal framework



Knowledge networking in society: Consultative arrangements



Development of knowledge organization (across departments)



Human resource policies

Once a reference system identifying such objective and the strategic practices
derived from them is identified, then corresponding benchmarks for each of the analytical
dimensions can be established. Of course, the precise specification of such measures is
always context-dependent: in Canada, for example, CRA has no formal role in preparing
tax laws and its relations with the legislature are largely confined to its budgetary
appropriation, its annual report and responses to questions raised in reports by the
Auditor-General. In contrast, in other countries, the revenue administration may play a
different and more autonomous role with respect both to legal drafting and relations with
the legislature.
The set of benchmark indicators in Table 2 is intended simply to illustrate how a
particular administration might be assessed in terms of achieving the objectives set out in
Table 1. Clearly, many of the indicators suggested must be derived from qualitative
analysis although it may be possible in some cases to quantify them to some extent – for
example, on the basis of expert evaluations (as in the EU ‗fiscal blueprint‘ discussed
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earlier) or experience in other jurisdictions.43 There is also some overlap with the sort of
performance service standards currently used in Canada and other countries to assess
performance. However, in line with the intent of systemic benchmarking -- namely, to
evaluate the overall performance of the tax administration in achieving its strategic
objectives (as set out, for example, in Table 1) -- the objectives considered in Table 2 and
hence the measures suggested are on the whole considerably broader than those usually
established by such ‗performance standards.‘ It is neither useful nor meaningful to
evaluate particular aspects of tax systems (such as administrative costs) or particular
institutional characteristics (such as functional organization) without considering
carefully how such practices relate to systemic improvements based on the best practices
observed in well-functioning administrations.
Copying even the best practices of the best systems is of course not a guarantee of
success when the systemic context in which the practice is embedded is fundamentally
different. To be useful as a guide to systemic improvement of any particular country‘s
revenue administration, benchmarking needs to be reformulated as a system-to-system
comparative exercise. There is still much to be learned with respect to how to carry out
such exercises. Consider, for example, how much one would need to know about all the
systemic aspects highlighted in Table 2 in order to be able to understand or make
productive use in any particular country of the valuable (but often rather baffling)
comparative information on tax administration so usefully compiled in recent years by
the OECD (2009). Even if one does understand, in depth, just what is being done (and
why it is being done) in any particular country, one may of course still be properly
skeptical of how useful it really is to think of transferring ways of doing things from one
country to another, particularly when the two are very different—for example, Australia
and Papua New Guinea.44 An analogy might be trying to improve a bicycle by studying a
Boeing 747.
Nonetheless, one conclusion seems clear from experience to date with attempts to
benchmark revenue administrations in developing countries. The best way to transfer
‗best practice‘ is to begin by being clear about the conceptual approaches to tax
administration underlying different systems. Whether or not such approaches are
explicitly recognized as such by those who actually run the tax administrations in
question, every administration is shaped by a set of on-going strategic practices. These
practices need to be singled out and assessed in order to understand both how their
interdependence affects outcomes and what outcomes are relevant measures of ‗success.‘
While we still have much to learn about how best to do this, future efforts at tax
administration reform in developing countries may prove more useful and successful in
the long run if they take the broader systemic approach suggested here rather than
narrowly focusing on such particular institutional features as the degree of autonomy of

43

As a further example, presumably one might devise quantitative measures of such indicators as
horizontal equity, compliance levels, and audit interventions, although we have not attempted to do so here.
44
For an early review of the tax system in Papua New Guinea, see Bird (1989a). As discussed in Bird
(1989), this example of course simply reinforces the critical importance of understanding in depth the
environment within which the tax administration must function.
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TABLE 2.

BENCHMARKS

B E N C HM AR K I N G M AN A GE RI AL P RA CT I CE

OBJECTIVES

R

E S U L T

I N D I C A T O R S

 Basic internal and control
systems of tax
administration

Assess the built-in efficiency and vulnerability of
tax administration
Is there a:
o secure and updated taxpayer account system?
o secure system of storing tax returns base
information?
o secure and updated registry of taxpayers

o efficient and accurate operation
of these systems
o deterrence of fraud and
corruption

 Higher concern for equity
than maximization of
collection

Assess equity as a tax administration priority.

o Higher horizontal equity
o Higher compliance
o Proper collection levels

 ―Internationalization‖ of tax
administration

Assess the level of international tax administration
activity.
o Services
o Audit
Development of operational practices to implement
the cooperative compliance model
Assessment of the instruments for achieving
cooperative compliance

o Higher horizontal equity
o Better compliance (collection)
levels from international
taxpayers
o Established protocols of
intervention
o Manuals
o Definition of operational
practices
o Number of totally automated
interactive transactions
o Number of transactions with
Internet access
o Improved services
o Enforceable service standards
o Focused audit interventions by
segments
o Reduction of non-compliance due
to deterrence
o Higher effectiveness of tax audit
targeting

 Formalization and
standardization of
cooperative compliance
processes
 Migration to web-based
interactive processes

Assess the depth of web- based processes and their
impact on the internal operation of tax
administration

 Client focus:

Assess the priority given to clients
o Self-propelled definition of service standards
o Segmentation of taxpayers

 Deepening of risk analysis

Does the administration have a system that covers
all risks inherent to the operation of the tax system?
o Taxpayer risks
o Sectoral risks
o Corruption risks
Does the tax administration rely heavily on
information provided by the taxpayer?
Is risk analysis embedded in the contents and
approach of the tax forms?
Do tax forms include qualitative information for
taxpayer profiling?

 Tax form information
strategy

 Participation in shaping of
legal framework

Is tax administration an important stakeholder in the
definition of tax legislation?

 Knowledge networking in
society: Consultative
arrangements

Is consensus a basis for interpreting and
implementing tax legislation?
Is private expertise embedded in regulatory
developments?

 Development of knowledge
organization

Is knowledge and staff development a priority in tax
administration?

o The possibility of deep
computerized audits
o Dissuasive effects generated by
the contents of forms

o Number of legal initiatives
drafted by tax administration
o Number of interventions of tax
administration experts in
Parliament
o Number of private-public
institutions dealing with taxation
o Number of administrative general
rulings conceived collectively
with civil society stake holders
o Number of meetings with
knowledge-based and/or civil
society groups
o Training impact on tax
administration performance
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the revenue administration or such quantitative but hard to interpret measures as the
administrative cost per dollar collected.
7. Conclusion
Several key lessons for would-be tax administration reformers about
benchmarking are suggested in this paper:
1. Benchmarking is not a simple process of blindly adopting the practices of
others, even if they are considered by experts to be ‗best in class.‘
2. Presumably the motivation for benchmarking is to spot opportunities for
change and improvement. In the case of revenue administration such opportunities are
often ‗soft‘ (qualitative) in nature and difficult to identify. Concentrating only on
gathering data on ‗hard‘ (quantifiable) systems, as economists in particular seem
programmed to do, is likely to result in severely incomplete information and may result
in changes (such as new technology) being implemented in an unsustainable manner.45
3. It is important to gather information also on such critical ‗soft‘ elements of
organisational ‗culture‘ as management philosophy, behaviors and style, the degree of
participative management, communication and recognition, empowerment, and
‗ownership.‘46
4. Even those in international agencies or elsewhere who may be unable (or
unwilling) to go very far along the path suggested in the last point need to understand
clearly that to be meaningful benchmarking must at a minimum be clearly linked to the
overall strategic plan or strategy of the administration. As Casanegra and Bird (1992)
noted some years ago, when there is no such strategy attempts to reform tax
administration, with or without benchmarking exercises, are almost inevitably a waste of
time.
Of course, it is also essential that those who are politically and managerially
responsible for tax administration both understand and support any benchmarking
exercise if it is to have any useful effects. To illustrate this point, the country study in the
course of which much of the argument above was originally developed turned out to be
not particularly productive. The reason is simple. The objectives of the client country‘s
operational team were different and focused within a different management paradigm.
They did not want to hear that to be able to implement ‗best practices‘ from developed
countries they had first to adopt a completely different approach to tax administration.
Rather than re-engineering their whole system, their focus within their existing paradigm
was primarily on adopting new ‗add-on‘ techniques to be measured by the achievement
of detailed quantitative objectives -- without paying attention to the critically different
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On the interplay between technology and tax administration, see Bird and Zolt (2008).
As emphasized earlier, it is of course extremely important to understand the environment within which
the administration functions: see Gill (2000). An important aspect of this environment may be what Nerre
(2008) calls ‗tax culture‘; for an interesting exploration of the very different ‗cultures‘ in China and
Australia, for example, see Huang (2010) and for an empirical look at some of the relevant factors, see
Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler (2008).
46
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meanings measures of such activities as audit and taxpayer services may have under
different strategic approaches to the task of administering a tax system.
This reaction was not surprising. Most people who are overweight want to
believe that there is a simple ‗magic bullet‘ that can resolve the problem. They want a
pill, a potion, or a machine that will make the problem go away. They do not want to
hear that what they really need to do is to change their diet and exercise regime for life.
Similarly, administrators understandably want to avoid such difficult, time-consuming,
and often conflict-laden tasks as rethinking what they are really doing and re-engineering
their whole organizational structure and processes to do it better. It always seems much
easier to buy a new IT approach off the shelf or to hire additional or better qualified (and
paid) staff than to change how one does business. It seems easier; but it is also on the
whole seems much less likely to produce ‗good‘ or ‗better‘ results, let alone the ‗best‘
results that are presumably the desired end goal.
As mentioned briefly earlier, an additional important aspect of systemic
benchmarking that has often been unduly neglected is the need to pay close attention to
the legal system, which is fundamental to the operation and hence the feasibility of any
approach to revenue administration. Poor laws erode the possibility of successful
administration, and if such erosion possibilities are overwhelming—as they are in some
developing countries—attempts to improve fiscal outcomes by modernizing
administration are unlikely to be rewarding, although they are all too likely to be costly.
In addition to the quality (and quantity) of substantive tax laws, many other legal aspects
need to be critically benchmarked against good practice to determine the extent to which
they provide adequate underpinnings for such critical activities of a good revenue
administration as risk management, service standards, web-based administration, and the
implementation of cooperative compliance.
Finally, to end as we began, one must always remember that benchmarking and
diagnosis are very different. Even the best benchmarks, however useful, can never
replace the educated eye of an expert in providing a diagnosis of a given situation—
although they can certainly help by directing that eye to problematic areas. Just as
medical doctors must interpret test results (which, incidentally, are also usually
‗benchmarked‘ against presumably relevant and reliable information), those who wish to
improve the dark art of revenue administration must understand in depth not only exactly
what is meant by specific benchmarks but also (and equally in depth) the context within
they are interpreted in order to provide sound recommendations. Better diagnostic tools
may improve diagnosis, but even the best tool cannot replace a good doctor. Similarly,
even the best designed tax administration in any particular context is unlikely, in the end,
to function well unless it has both adequate political support (including resources) from
the top and a good management team in place.
In conclusion, benchmarking can be a useful tool for tax administration
modernization efforts (Gallagher 2005; Crandall 2010). However, it seems more than
time to reconsider the appropriate reference standard to which administrations in
emerging countries are benchmarked. Over the last few decades tax administration
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management in countries such as Australia and Canada has altered in important ways
from the old coercive tradition still found in most developing countries towards the new
cooperative compliance approach discussed above, in addition to broadening their
horizons to include the international aspect and substantially advancing their use of
technology. As yet, however, few emerging countries (even countries like Chile and
Mexico that have made substantial modernization efforts in terms of the technology they
employ) have as yet moved very far in this direction,.47
No doubt countries will never be able to improve their tax administrations much
in advance of the changes in the underlying political, economic, and social environment
that are ultimately needed to support and sustain such improvements. Since taxation is
one of the principal interfaces between state and society, however, some significant
environmental factors themselves depend on how the tax system is designed and
implemented.48 Indeed, it may not be too much to say that the improvement of many
developing countries may in the end depend to a substantial extent upon the improvement
of their revenue administrations.49 A more comprehensive approach to ‗systemic
benchmarking‘ along the lines sketched in this paper may perhaps play a critical role in
facilitating that improvement.

47

Bird and Zolt (2008) survey the use of IT in developing country tax systems.
An interesting historical example of this interdependence is the change in France‘s tax system during the
18th century, and particularly in how it was administered – a change that Kwass (2000) argues was directly
instrumental in bringing about the French Revolution at the end of the century.
49
In addition to Brautigam, Fjeldstad and Moore (2007), see the interesting models set out in Besley and
Persson (2010) and Cardenas and Tuzeman (2010).
48

30

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

References
Aberbach, Joel D. and Tom Christensen (2007) ―The Challenges of Modernizing Tax
Administration: Putting Customers First in Coercive Public Organizations,‖ Public Policy
and Administration, 22 (2): 155-82.
Altman, Zvi D. (2006) Dispute Resolution Under Tax Treaties (Amsterdam: IBFD).
Anton, Arturo and Fausto Hernandez (2010) ―VAT Collection and Social Security
Contributions under Tax Evasion: Is There a Link?‖ CIDE (Centro de Investigacion y
Docencia Economicas) Documento de Trabajo no. 480.
Arendse, Jackie (2010) ―Is the Penalty System in the South African Tax Environment an
Effective Deterrent to Tax Evasion?‖ Paper presented to 9th International Tax
Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Arnold, Brian (2011) ―Making Tax Policy and Consultation,‖ The Arnold Report
(Canadian Tax Foundation), March 1
<https://www.ctf.ca/ctfweb/EN/Newsletters/The_Arnold_Report/2011/2011_BArnold_0
09.aspx>
Australian Tax Office (ATO) (2000) Cooperative Compliance: Working with Large
Business in the New Tax System
<http://www.ato.gov.au/businesses/content.asp?doc=/content/22630.htm>
ATO (2001) International Benchmarking of GST Administration. Canberra.
<http://www.ato.gov.au/fsmke/gstadmin.pdf>
ATO (2009) Compliance Program 2008-09
<http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/00155156.htm>
Baer Katharine, Olivier Benon, and Juan Toro (2002) Improving Large Taxpayers’
Compliance: A Review of Country Experience, Occasional Paper 215 (Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund).
Bagchi, Amaresh, Richard M. Bird, and Arindam Das-Gupta (1995) An Economic
Approach to Tax Administration Reform. Discussion Paper No. 3, International Centre for
Tax Studies, University of Toronto, November.
<http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/iib/icts/ICTS03.pdf>
Barbone, Luca, Arindam, Das-Gupta, De Wulf, Luc, Hanson, Anna (1999), Reforming
Tax Systems - The World Bank Record in the 1990s. Policy Research Working Paper
WPS2237, World Bank, Washington, November.
Behn, Robert D. (2003) ―Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require
Different Measures,‖ Public Administration Review, 63 (5): 586-606.

Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing Countries: A Systemic Approach

31

Bentley, Duncan (2007) Taxpayers’ Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation (Kluwer
Law International).
Bentley, Duncan and Stiaan Klue (2010) ―Bridging the Revenue Authority/Tax
Practitioner Gap: Lessons from Best Practice and their Application to South Africa,‖
Paper presented to 9th International Tax Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010,
Sydney.
Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson (2010) ―Pillars of Prosperity: Peace, Easy Taxes
and the Rule of Law,‖ Unpublished; December.
Biber, Edmund (2010) Revenue Administration: Taxpayer Audit—Development of
Effective Plans, Technical Guidance Note, Fiscal Affairs Department, International
Monetary Fund, April.
Biber, Edmund (2010a) Revenue Administration: Taxpayer Audit—The Use of Indirect
Methods, Technical Guidance Note, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary
Fund, April.
Bird, Richard M. (1976) ―Assessing Tax Performance in Developing Countries: A
Critical Review of the Literature,‖ Finanzarchiv, 34 (2): 244-65.
Bird, Richard M. (1989) ―The Administrative Dimension of Tax Reform in Developing
Countries‖, in Malcolm Gillis, ed., Lessons from Tax Reform in Developing Countries
(Durham: Duke University Press), pp. 315-46.
Bird, Richard M. (1989a) ―Taxation in Papua New Guinea: Backwards to the Future?‖
World Development, 17 (8): 1145-57.
Bird, Richard M. (2002) ―Why Tax Corporations?‖ Bulletin for International Fiscal
Documentation, 56 (5): 194-203.
Bird, Richard M. (2004) ―Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform,‖ Asia-Pacific Tax
Bulletin, 10 (3): 134-50.
Bird, Richard M. and Susan Banta (2000) ―Fiscal Sustainability and Fiscal Indicators in
Transitional Countries,‖ in A. Shapleigh, F. Andic, and S. Banta, eds., Transition
Economies and Fiscal Reforms. Proceedings of the Conference on Central and Eastern
Europe and the New Independent States, Istanbul, July 1999 (Washington: USAID,
2000), pp. 13-42.
Bird, Richard M. and Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. (1992) Improving Tax
Administration in Developing Countries (Washington: International Monetary Fund,
1992).

32

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Bird, Richard M. and Oliver Oldman (2000) Improving Taxpayer Service and
Facilitating Compliance in Singapore, PREM Note Number 48, The World Bank,
December 2000.
Bird, Richard M. and Eric M. Zolt (2008) ―Technology and Taxation in Developing
Countries: From Hand to Mouse,‖ National Tax Journal, 61 (4, Part 2): 791-821.
Bird, Richard M., Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Benno Torgler (2008) ―Tax Effort in
Developing Countries and High Income Countries: The Impact of Corruption, Voice and
Accountability,‖ Economic Analysis & Policy, 38 (1): 55-71.
Braithwaite, Vivian (2003) ―A New Approach to Tax Compliance,‖ in V. Braithwaite,
ed., Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion (Aldershot UK:
Ashgate).
Brautigam Deborah, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, and Mick Moore M, eds. (2007) Taxation and
State-Building in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA) (2003) ―Service Improvement in the
CCRA, Strengthened Partnerships and Co-operation (2003),‖ updated October 29 of 2003
[no longer available on-line].
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) (2008) Performance Report on Sustainable
Development 2007-2008 < http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/gncy/sstnbl/prfrmnc/menueng.html>
CRA (2009) Annual Report to Parliament 2008-2009 < http://www.craarc.gc.ca/gncy/nnnl/menu-eng.html>
Cardenas, Mauricio and Daniel Tuzeman (2010) ―Under-Investment in State Capacity:
The Role of Inequality and Political Instability,‖ Brookings Institution, Washington,
September.
Casanegra de Jantscher, Milka and Richard M. Bird (1992) ―The Reform of Tax
Administration,‖ in Richard M. Bird and Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. (1992)
Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries (Washington: International
Monetary Fund), pp. 1-15.
Crandall, William (2010) Revenue Administration: Performance Measurement in Tax
Administration, Technical Guidance Note, Fiscal Affairs Department, International
Monetary Fund, June.
Das Gupta, Arindam (2002) ―Central Tax and Administration Reform in the 1990s: An
Assessment‖, in M. Govinda Rao, ed. Development, Poverty, and Fiscal Policy (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press), pp. 139-73.

Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing Countries: A Systemic Approach

33

De Paula, Aureo and Jose A. Scheinkman (2009) ―The Informal Sector: An Equilibrium
Model and Some Empirical Evidence from Brazil,‖ PIER Working Paper 09-44,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
De Paula, Aureo and Jose A. Scheinkman (2009a) ―Value Added Taxes, Chain Effects
and Informality,‖ Second Version, PIER Working Paper 09-041, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
Eccleston, Richard (2010) ―Institutionalising International Cooperation in Tax
Administration: The Evolution and Effectiveness of the OECD Forum on Tax
Administration,‖ Paper presented to 9th International Tax Administration Conference, 7-9
April 2010, Sydney.
European Commission (2007) Fiscal Blueprints, A path to a robust, modern and efficient
tax administration (Brussels).
European Commission (2010) Compliance Risk Management for Tax Administration
(Brussels).
Evans,Chris (2008) ―Taxation compliance and administrative costs: an overview,‖ in
Michael Lang, C. Obermair, J. Schuch, C. Staringer and P.Weninger, eds., Tax
compliance costs for companies in an enlarged European Community (Linde Verlag,
Vienna and Kluwer Law International: London), pp. 447-68.
Forsund, Finn R., Sverre A.C. Kittelsen, Frode Linseth and Dag Fjeld Edvardsen (2006)
―The Tax Man Cometh – But Is He Efficient?‖ National Institute Economic Review, no.
197, 106-19.
Gallagher, Mark (2005) ―Benchmarking Tax Systems,‖ Public Administration and
Development, 25: 125-40.
Gill, Jit B. S. (2000) A Diagnostic Framework for Revenue Administration World Bank
Technical Papers No 472 (Washington DC: World Bank).
Goodhart, C.A.E. (1975) "Monetary Relationships: A View from Threadneedle Street,"
Papers in Monetary Economics (vol. 1, Reserve Bank of Australia)
Gordon, Roger and Wei Li (2009) ―Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many
Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,‖ Journal of Public Economics, 93: 855-66.
HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) (2010) Measuring Tax Gaps 2010. An Official
Statistics Release, September.
Huang, Eva (2010) ―Should China adopt Australian Summons and Access Powers? A
Comparative Study of the Access and Summons Powers of the Revenue Authorities of

34

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Australia and China,‖ Paper presented to 9th International Tax Administration
Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Hood, Christopher (2007) Public Service Management by Numbers: Why Does it Vary? Where
Has it Come From? What Are the Gaps and the Puzzles? Public Money and Management, 27(2):
95-102.

Hunter, William J. and Michael A. Nelson (1996) ―An IRS Production Function,‖
National Tax Journal, 49 (1): 105-15.
Institute of Fiscal Studies (1998) Final Report on Tax Legislation (London).
International Finance Corporation (IFC) (2007) Designing a Tax System for Micro and
Small Businesses (Washington).
International Tax Dialogue (2010) Revenue Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa, ITD
Comparative Information Series No. 1 <available at www.itdweb.org>
Keen, Michael and Jenny Ligthart (2006) "Incentives and Information Exchange in
International Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, 13: 163-180.
Kelly, Gail and Virginia Hopkins-Burns (2010) ―Building Bridges to the Community:
Using Customer-Centric Measures of Satisfaction and Perceptions,‖ Paper presented to
9th International Tax Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Klun, Maja (2004) ―Performance Measurement for Tax Administrations: The Case of
Slovenia,‖ International Review of Administrative Sciences, 70 (3): 567-74.
Khwaja, Munawer Sultan, Rajul Awasthi, and Jan Loeprick, eds. (2010) Risk Based Tax
Audits: Approaches and Country Experiences, World Bank, Washington.
Kwass, Michael (2000) Privilege and the Politics of Taxation in Eighteenth-Century
France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Larin, Gilles and Robert Duong (2009) Effective Responses to Aggressive Tax Planning:
What Canada Can Learn from Other Jurisdictions (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation).
Le, Tuan Minh, Duc Minh Tham, and Luc De Wulf (2007) Estimating Economic Benefits
for Revenue Administration Programs, World Bank PREM Note 112, March.
Manaf, Nor Aziah Abdul , Zuaini Ishak, and Suraya Abdul Warig (2010) ―The
Acceptance of E-filing among Individual Taxpayers,‖ Paper presented to 9th International
Tax Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Moesen, W. and A. Persoon (2002) ―Measuring and Explaining the Productive Efficiency
of Tax Offices: A Non-Parametric Best Practice Frontier Approach,‖ Tijdschrift voor
Economie en Management, 47 (3): 399-416.

Benchmarking Tax Administrations in Developing Countries: A Systemic Approach

35

Nerré, Birger (2008) ―Tax Culture: A Basic Concept for Tax Politics,‖ Economic
Analysis and Policy, 38 (1): 153-67.
Noordegraaf, Mirko and Tineke Abma (2003) ―Management by Measurement? Public
Management Practices amidst Ambiguity,‖ Public Administration, 81 (4): 853-71.
Oldman, Oliver (1965) ―Controlling Income Tax Evasion,‖ in Organization of American
States, Joint Tax Program, Problems of Tax Administration in Latin America (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press).
OECD (2009) Tax Administration Comparative Information 2008 (Paris)
Paul, Samuel (1995) A Report Card on Public Services in Indian Cities: A View from
Below (Bangalore: Public Affairs Centre).
Pinhanez, Monica (2008) Reinventing VAT Collection: Industry Vertical Assessment,
Revenue Increase, and Public Sector Reliability, Ph.D. thesis, MIT.
Pinto, Dale and Adrian Sawyer (2010) ―Building Bridges between Revenue Authorities:
Would a World Tax Organisation be a Key Facilitator?‖ Paper presented to 9th
International Tax Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Pollitt, Christopher (2006) ―Performance Management in Practice: A Comparative Study
of Executive Agencies,‖ Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16 (1):
25-44.
Pomeranz, Dina (2010) ―No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and SelfEnforcement in the Value Added Tax,‖ Unpublished paper; November.
Propper, Carol and Deborah Wilson (2007) ―The Use and Usefulness of Performance
Measures in the Public Sector,‖ Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 19 (2): 250-67.
Radian, Alex (1980) Resource Mobilization in Poor Countries (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books).
Reinikka, Ritva (1999) Using Surveys for Public Sector Reform, PREM Note Number 23,
World Bank, May.
Robinson, Leslie and Joel Slemrod (2009) “Measuring the Impact of Tax Systems on
Economic Behavior Using New Cross-Country Data” available at < http://areas.kenanflagler.unc.edu/Accounting/TaxCenter/taxsym09/Documents/RobinsonSlemrod_2008010
2.pdf>
Serra, Pablo (2003) ―Measuring the Performance of Chile‘s Tax Administration,‖
National Tax Journal, 56 (2): 373-83.

36

International Studies Program Working Paper Series

Sia, Siew Kiem and Boon Seong Neo (1997) ―Reengineering Effectiveness and the
Redesign of Organizational Control: A Case Study of the Inland Revenue Authority of
Singapore,‖ Journal of Management Information Services, 14: 69-82.
Silvani, Carlos A. and Alberto H.J. Radano (1992) ―Tax Administration Reform in
Bolivia and Uruguay,‖ in Richard M. Bird and Milka Casanegra de Jantscher, eds. (1992)
Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries (Washington: International
Monetary Fund), pp. 19-59.
Smulders, Sharon and Gelishan Naidoo (2010) ―Small Business Tax Compliance
Burden—Is the South African Revenue Service (SARS) Building Bridges, Roads or
Pathways to Alleviate this Burden?‖ Paper presented to 9th International Tax
Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.
Van Stolk, Christian and Kai Weingrich (2008) ―Convergence without Diffusion? A
Comparative Analysis of Performance Indicators in Tax Administration and Social
Security,‖ International Review of Administrative Sciences, 74 (4): 589-614.
Vázquez-Caro, Jaime (1992) ―Comments,‖ in Richard M. Bird and Milka Casanegra de
Jantscher, eds. (1992) Improving Tax Administration in Developing Countries
(Washington: International Monetary Fund), pp. 145-54.
Vázquez-Caro, Jaime and José Abelino Ospina (2006) ―Evaluación sistématica de la ley
impositiva colombiana,‖ in Bases para una Reforma Tributaria Estructural en Colombia
(Bogota: Fedesarrollo), pp. 385-507.
Vazquez-Caro, Jaime, Gary Reid, and Richard M. Bird (1992) Tax Administration
Assessment in Latin America, Report No. 13, Regional Studies Program, Latin American
and the Caribbean Technical Department, World Bank, Washington.
Von Soest, Christian (2007) ―Measuring the Capability to Raise Revenue: Process and
Output Dimensions and Their Application to the Zambian Revenue Authority,‖ Public
Administration and Development, 27: 353-65.
Whait, Robert (2010) ―Tax Administration – Not Just for the Tax Administrators!‖ Paper
presented to 9th International Tax Administration Conference, 7-9 April 2010, Sydney.

